Legal News

Case Summaries

Probate Trusts

[02/25] Conservatorship of John L.
In a petition to establish a conservatorship of a person pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, the judgment of the court of appeal is affirmed where: 1) the superior court did not violate the LPS Act when it excused the individual's production and proceeded without him in attendance at a hearing to establish a conservatorship of his person; and 2) the superior court did not violate his due process rights.

[02/25] Donahue v. Donahue
Trial court's order, charging a trust with some $5 million in past and ongoing attorney fees incurred on behalf of a former trustee in defending against the beneficiary's allegations of self-dealing and conflict of interest is reversed as it cannot be determined from the trial court's order whether the fee awards are consistent with applicable legal principles. Long-established principles of trust law impose a double-barreled reasonableness requirement where: 1) the fee award must be reasonable in amount and reasonably necessary to the conduct of litigation; and 2) it also must be reasonable and appropriate for the benefit of the trust.

[02/11] Estate of Tolman
Denial of a granddaughter's petition to determine persons entitled to distribution from her grandmother's estate is affirmed as the exclusion of unmentioned heirs or relatives from the will's dispositions, or an intent to disinherit those who contest those dispositions, does not sufficiently express or manifest an intent to arrest the operation of the anti-lapse law following a legatee's death.

[01/29] Estate of Artall v. Comm'r. of Int'l. Rev.
In the taxpayer's appeal from the tax court's approval of the IRS Commissioner's disallowance of a "qualified family-owned business interest" estate tax deduction to the taxpayer estate, the tax court's order is affirmed where the "qualified family-owned business interest" deduction of 26 U.S.C. section 2057 is available for an estate's qualifying equity or ownership interests but not for debt interests such as loans receivable.

[01/15] Carroll v. Carroll
In an action seeking to remove a trustee of an irrevocable trust, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the judgment of the county court vacated as the county court at law had no jurisdiction to grant the relief sought and the judgment it rendered was void because the Texas Property Code vests exclusive jurisdiction over the claims in the case in the district court.

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Insurance Law

[03/17] Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
In an action seeking car rental costs from an insurer arising out of an auto accident, dismissal of the complaint is affirmed where, under California law, an insurer is permitted to recoup a payout from a third-party tortfeasor's insurance company before the insured has sued the third-party tortfeasor, and without first making the insured whole.

[03/16] Pendergest-Holt v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's
In an action by various insureds, including R. Allen Stanford, each faced with civil and criminal allegations that they engaged in a massive Ponzi scheme, seeking reimbursement of defense costs under a directors' and officers' liability policy from the policy's underwriters, an injunction prohibiting defendant-insurers from withholding defense funds is affirmed with modifications and remanded, and the underwriters are enjoined from refusing to advance defense costs as provided for in the D&O Policy unless and until a court "determine[s] in fact" by clear and convincing evidence "that the alleged act or alleged acts [of Money Laundering] did in fact occur."

[03/15] Catlin Syndicate Ltd. v. Imperial Palace of Miss., Inc.
In a declaratory judgment action by an insurer seeking a declaration that the policy did not cover certain Hurricane Katrina-related losses, summary judgment for plaintiff is affirmed where the proper method for determining loss under the business-interruption provision was to look at sales before the interruption rather than sales after the interruption.

[03/15] N.Y. Marine & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc.
In an action by a barge operator against an insurer for defense costs associated with Hurricane Katrina-related damages, the district court's order (1) dismissing all causes of action brought against defendant, (2) granting plaintiff the fees and expenses of two of the three law firms it retained to defend Katrina-related actions, and (3) denying plaintiff's motion to transfer and its application for attorneys' fees, is affirmed in part where: 1) the locus of operative facts as well as the interests of efficiency and fairness favored a New York forum; 2) the term "otherwise" in the insurance policy did not include the kind of relationship associated with a shipowner's bailment to a terminal operator, which was at issue in this case; 3) plaintiff did not have a right to pursue independent counsel to defend the Katrina actions whose legal fees would be covered by the primary policy; 4) because summary judgment in favor of defendant was warranted based on the simple non-coverage of the barge under the policy, and because there was no dispute that the primary policy had been exhausted, the excess policy applied to cover expenses in excess of the primary policy's limits. However, the order is vacated in part where coverage for fees earned by both counsel, either as excess to defendant's primary policy or as initial coverage for plaintiff's independent counsel, was intended pursuant to the umbrella coverage provided by the excess policy.

[03/12] Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of America v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., Inc.
In plaintiff-insurers' action seeking reimbursement for their settlement contribution against its insured arising from an underlying lawsuit for antitrust violation and tortious interference with contract and with other business relations, district court's judgment is affirmed in its entirety where: 1) Kentucky will allow reimbursement for an insurer after a unilateral reservation of rights by the insurer over the objection of the insured in at least the narrow circumstances posed in this case and in cases such as Blue Ridge; 2) the district court did not err in finding that disparagement was not part of the underlying litigation at the time of the settlement, and thus, plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement of the settlement funds paid on behalf of the defendant; 3) the district court was correct in determining that plaintiff's duty to defend was triggered on November 8, 1999, the date the First Amended Complaint was docketed; and 4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the damages and pre-judgment interest awarded.

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Health Law

[03/17] Buck v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch.
In plaintiff's lawsuit against her former law school claiming violation of the ADA and breach of various implied contracts, arising from her dismissal from the law school for falling below the required minimum G.P.A. of 2.0, dismissal of the lawsuit is affirmed where plaintiff is precluded by res judicata from raising the claims at issue as she should have supplemented her complaint in state court with claims that arose during the pendency of that suit.

[03/16] Schexnayder v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co.
In an ERISA action claiming that defendant-insurer wrongly denied plaintiff disability benefits, summary judgment on the merits for plaintiff is affirmed where defendant's decision was procedurally unreasonable because the Social Security Administration (SSA) determined that plaintiff was fully disabled and unable to perform any work, but defendant did not address the SSA award in any of its denial letters. However, the district court's order granting plaintiff attorney's fees is reversed where the legal questions in this case were much closer than the district court credited, and the district court therefore abused its discretion in assessing attorneys' fees against defendant.

[03/16] US v. Livesay
In defendant's appeal from the district court's order committing him to the custody of the Attorney General while expressly leaving open the possibility of his release, either conditionally or unconditionally, at a later date, the order is affirmed where the district court was correct when it concluded that it was not statutorily authorized to afford defendant a conditional release, even if it wished to do so.

[03/11] Schaar v. Lehigh Valley Health Servs., Inc.
In plaintiff's suit against her former employer for violation of the FMLA, summary judgment in favor employer is vacated and remanded as an employee may satisfy her burden of proving three days of incapacitation through a combination of expert medical and lay testimony. Here, when expert medical opinion of a doctor that plaintiff was incapacitated for two days because of her illness is combined with plaintiff's lay testimony that she was incapacitated for two additional days, it necessarily follows that a material issue of fact exists as to whether plaintiff suffered from a serious health condition.

[03/10] Primiano v. Cook
In an action against the manufacturer of an artificial elbow, summary judgment for defendant is reversed where the exclusion of plaintiff's expert's evidence was error as plaintiff's expert, with a sufficient basis in education and experience, testified that the artificial joint "failed to perform in the manner reasonably to be expected in light of its nature and intended function," which was enough to assist a trier of fact.

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Elder Law

[02/05] Villano v. Waterman Convalescent Hosp., Inc.
In plaintiff's action against a convalescent hospital claiming she was admitted without her consent, judgment of the trial court is affirmed where, although a stipulated judgment is appealable, plaintiff cannot show that allegedly erroneous rulings were prejudicial.

[12/22] Massey v. Mercy Med. Center Redding
In plaintiff's negligence action against a nurse and the hospital that employed the nurse alleging that he sustained injury after falling from a walker because the nurse placed the plaintiff on the walker and left him unattended, judgment of the trial court is reversed in part where: 1) the question of nurse's alleged negligence for the fall poses a question of common knowledge, and therefore does not require expert opinion testimony; and 2) trial court's judgment that denied plaintiff's attempt to amend his complaint to add causes of action for battery, fraud and elder abuse is affirmed.

[12/21] Grace Healthcare of Benton v. US Dept. of Health & Hum. Servs.
In a petition for review of a civil monetary penalty imposed by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services on petitioner nursing home for an "immediate jeopardy" violation of 42 C.F.R. section 483.13(c), which required nursing homes to thoroughly investigate all allegations of resident neglect or abuse, including injuries of unknown sources, the petition is granted where the Secretary's finding of the likely harm necessary to warrant an immediate-jeopardy-level finding was based on pure speculation and not supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record as a whole.

[12/01] Yarick v. Pacificare of California
In plaintiff-estate's suit against defendant health care providers and health care benefits providers alleging that the events resulting in decedent's death happened because of the financial pressures and incentive that arose from the care providers' contracts with the defendants, trial court's order sustaining defendants' demurrer is affirmed as: 1) federal law expressly preempts applications of state laws where standards for Medicare Advantage plans are established pursuant to the Medicare law; and 2) to the extent the plaintiff seeks to allege causes of action based on state common law concepts of duty independent of the Health and Safety Code provisions cited, those common law causes of action are preempted.

[11/30] Holbert v. Fremont Inv. & Loan
In plaintiff's suit against a financial lender, dismissal of the complaint is affirmed where: 1) defendant was not required to comply with the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA), which applies when the finance charges imposed on a loan exceed a certain threshold; 2) two charges imposed on plaintiff, one to pay off a preexisting debt to another lender and another to satisfy a prepayment penalty on a prior home loan, were not finance charges within the meaning of HOEPA; 3) plaintiff has not established a claim against defendant for unfair business practices; and 4) while plaintiff may have a viable claim against her loan broker for financial elder abuse based on various misrepresentations made during the loan process, she failed to link that claim to defendant, who is as much a victim of the broker's misrepresentations as plaintiff.

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